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SIXTH AMENDMENT RISING:
THE NEWLY EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR
TRIAL BY JURY IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Robert Hardawayi
"(We must) remain true to the principles that emerged from the framer's "fears' that the jury right
could be lost not only by gross denial, but by erosion... (A jury must try) all facts necessary to
constitute a statutory offense..."
-Justice Stevens writing for the majority in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000)2

1.

INTRODUCTION

The right to trial by jury in criminal cases is enshrined in Article Ill, Section 2, Clause 3 of the
U.S. Constitution which provides that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury." 3 Although this appears to render superfluous the Sixth Amendment guarantee
that, " [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a...trial by an impartial
jury," 4 the repeat of this right in the Bill of Rights serves to highlight its importance in the minds of
the framers.
Likewise, in civil suits at common law where the amount in controversy exceeds twenty
dollars, the Seventh Amendment provides that "the right to trial by jury shall be preserved..." 5
The Seventh Amendment, unlike the Sixth, 6 has never been found to be an essential
element of due process, and thus has never been applied to the states via incorporation into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
been meticulous in enforcing its provisions to the letter in the federal courts, holding that civil

I Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The views expressed herein are my own and
do not necessarily reflect the views of any of my colleagues at the Sturm College of Law. I also wish to
acknowledge and give credit to Judge Morris B. Hoffman, District Judge for the Second Judicial District of
Colorado. I have borrowed liberally from his excellent article in the Duke Law Journal which was published
in 2003 and entitled The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951 (2003). Although that article focused
primarily on the historical, empirical and policy case for jury sentencing, his seven page constitutional case
for jury sentencing set forth the most articulate constitutional case for jury sentencing in the aftermath of
Apprendi, and provided the seeds and basis for what is essentially my 2003-2010 update to his
constitutional case.
2 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483-84 (2000).
3 U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl.3. However, unlike the 6th amendment, art. III § 2, cl. 3 does not state that it applies
to "all criminal prosecutions.' U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Skilling v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2912-13 (2010); Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1396
(2010) (Thomas, J. concurring); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597 n. 3 (2002); Harris v. U.S., 536 U.S. 545, 549
(2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-77 (2000); U.S. v. Rodriguez- Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 278
(1999); Lewis v. U.S., 518 U.S. 322, 325 (1996); U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509-10 (1995); Sullivan v. Louisiana,
508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 445 (2001)
(Ginsburg, J. dissenting); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 n.22 (1999); City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708 (1999).
6 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
7 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) (citing Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92
(1876)); Id. at n. 14; See also Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951,
n. 72 (2003).
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litigants in suits at common law have a right to a jury in both phases of the civil trial. Specifically,
civil litigants have a right to have a jury determine both the defendant's liability, as well as the
amount of damages to which a plaintiff is entitled if liability is determined.8
Given the court's scrupulous upholding and enforcement of the Seventh Amendment's
right to a jury in all phases of civil cases involving complaints for money, it is all the more surprising
that in criminal cases, where an accused faces loss of liberty or even death, many courts -indeed, most courts -- routinely deny an accused the right to jury in the most critical phase of the
criminal trial, namely the sentencing phase.9 While courts routinely accord an accused a right
to a jury in the guilt or innocence phase, 10 an accused's actual sentence is routinely left to the
mercy of an individual judge who, depending on his mood or predilection, has the broadest
discretion in imposing a sentence. Not surprisingly, such a sentence may range anywhere from
no punishment at all, punishment that is suspended along with probation, to life imprisonment.11
Inexplicably, most legislative attempts to address this kind of unbridled judicial discretion
have come not in the form of simply requiring judicial adherence to the Sixth Amendment, but
rather by promulgating so-called "sentencing guidelines." 12 The success of such guidelines is
unclear however; specifically such success is unclear in light of judicial attempts in some lower
courts to undermine or bypass this type of limitation on judicial discretion. 13 In fact, higher courts
have also attempted to bypass these limitations; leading these courts into thickets of legal
obfuscation so dense that one senses desperation on their part in later cases to somehow find a
way out of them. 14
Interestingly, if a federal court today held that the right to a jury in civil cases extended
only to the first half of a civil trial and then denied the right of a plaintiff to have his damages
determined by a jury, there would be an explosion of outrage. Such outrage would reflect a
blatant denial of the rights guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment, not only on the part of the
trial bar, but by the general citizenry-and rightly so. What is the explanation, then, for such
general acquiescence to the right of men and women being marched into captivity based on

8 See, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Chauffeurs v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990);
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323
(1966); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500
(1959); I.L.C. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Judge Morris Hoffman, in his Duke Law Review article
"The Case for Jury Sentencing' has set forth in comprehensive detail the high court cases which have
attempted to distinguish the Sixth and Seventh Amendments and explain why a civil litigant is accorded a
right to jury in both phases of a civil trial, but an accused only has a right to jury in the first phase of a
criminal trial. See e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951 (2003). Accordingly,
no attempt is made to treat that subject here.
9 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 4; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-103 (1987); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 557.036 (West 1999); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §§ 926.1, 927.1 (West Supp. 2003); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07(2) (b) (West 2006);
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-295 (West 2007).
10 Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 49 (1995); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509-10 (1995); Sullivan
v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993).
ii Hoffman, supra note 7, at 987, 994-95; U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (citing Apprendi v New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949)); See also Apprendi, 530 U.S.
466, 547-48 (2000) (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
12 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553; USSG; 28 U.S.C.A. § 994 (describing Sentencing Commission's duties); Booker 543 U.S.
at 245; Jackson Jones, The United States Sentencing Guidelines are not Law!: Establishing the reasons
"United States Sentencing Guidelines" and "Ex Post Facto Clause" Should Never be used in the Some
Sentence, 32 U. La Verne L. Rev. 7, 14-17 (2010) (describing the history and purposes of the federal
sentencing guidelines).
13 See e.g. United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bowers, 242 Fed. Appx.
558, 559-60 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Burdex, 100 F.3d 882, 884-86 (10th Cir. 1996).
14 See e.g Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007); Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296 (2004); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986);
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
ROBERT HARDAWAY
53

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol1/iss1/5

2

Hardaway: Sixth Amendment Rising: The Newly Emerging Constitutional Case fo
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL ]LAW REVIEW

SPRING

2011

the decision of a single man or woman? More pointedly, was this what the framers had in mind
when they promulgated the Sixth Amendment command to provide an accused the right to a
trial by jury in all criminal cases? And if it was not, what is the explanation for how the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial came to be so diluted during the same period of American
judicial history when the Seventh Amendment came to be so meticulously and scrupulously
adhered to?
The public policy arguments in favor of jury sentencing can already be found in scholarly
literature. Notably, Chief Justice William Rehnquist has remarked that "[i]ndividual sentencing
juries are, by design, better suited than courts to evaluating and giving effect to the complex
societal and moral considerations that inform the selection of publicly acceptable criminal
punishments." 15
Standing in stark contrast to the current sentencing norms, military courts feature a court
panel (analogous to the jury in civilian courts) which decides both guilt as well as punishment, if
necessary. As a JAG officer, I practiced in these latter courts and I was always impressed by the
fairness of sentences imposed by the jury. Also impressive was the procedure under which an
accused was able to present his own extenuation and mitigation evidence without fear that a
heavily bureaucratized probation department would attempt to influence the court with reports
featuring hearsay and other uncross-examined sources. 16
Currently a handful of states provide its accused with the right to a jury trial during
sentencing.17 However, following the lead of Chief Justice Rehnquist, there have been a
number of scholars who have made an empirical and public policy case for jury sentencing in
criminal cases.18 In fact, one of the more persuasive and eloquent public policy cases for jury
sentencing has been recently set forth by Yale law student Adriana Lamni in a Note in the Yale
Law Journal 19 -- which garnered praise from Denver District Court Judge Morris Hoffman as the
"first article in eighty-one years to call for a return to jury sentencing." 20
With the Chief Justice's public policy case for jury sentencing foundationally in mind,
along with the 2000 Supreme Court decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 21 and also Judge
Hoffman's remarkable article 22 in the Duke Law Journal, this article will focus on the constitutional
case for jury sentencing in criminal cases.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324 (2002) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
See 57 C.J.S. Generally § 580 (2010); 57 C.J.S. Deliberations and Voting § 585 (2010)
i7 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-103 (West 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.036 (West 1999); OKLA. STAT.
15

16

ANN.

tit. 22, §§ 926.1,

927.1 (West 2011); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.07(2) (b) (Vernon 1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295

(West 2000) (as cited in Hoffman, supra note 7, at 953 n.1as the only five states that allow for jury sentencing
for noncapital offenses); Hoffman, supra note 7, at 954 n.4 ("Of the thirty-eight states with capital
punishment, twenty-nine leave the sentencing decision to the jury. At least before Rina v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584 (2002), only five states--Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska--gave the trial court judge,
or a panel of judges, the exclusive power to decide the capital punishment issue.').
is Hoffman, supra note 7; Adriann Lanni, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An idea Whose Time Has
Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775 (1999).
19
20
21
22

Lanni, supra note 18.
Hoffman, supra note 7, at 951 n.d1.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483-84 (2000).
Hoffman, supra note 7, at 968-85.
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HISTORY

Although the phrase "shall be preserved" regarding the right to jury trial is found only in
the Seventh Amendment, 23 and not the Sixth, it follows that the right to jury trial in criminal cases
was likewise meant to preserve the right to jury in criminal cases as it existed at the time that
both Section III and the Sixth Amendment were ratified. As Judge Hoffman has noted, judges at
common law had almost no discretion in imposing sentences at the relevant time since "[m]ost
offenses had mandatorily set punishments." 2 4 Accordingly, the judge's role in sentencing was
largely perfunctory and formalistic, and was, therefore, "simply to announce the mandatory
punishment." 25 Because these juries effectively imposed punishment by the simple expedient of
deciding what crime the accused was guilty of, it was inconceivable at that time that the judge
would in any way interfere with the jury's constitutional power to impose a sentence.
Although "judges sentenced in name only," 26 an illusion was nevertheless created in the
minds of future jurists that judges had actually been imposing sentences all along rather than
simply ritualistically announcing the sentence for the record. As the common law practice of
jury sentencing as it existed at ratification receded in the collective judicial memory, judges
began a gradual usurpation of the traditional common law jury function of imposing sentences
in criminal cases. 27 Such gradual usurpations were created, in large part, by the muddling of the
waters by legislative promulgations that created the "indeterminate sentence." 28 Such
legislative promulgations created an indisputably visible spectacle of a present day judge
confidently announcing a sentence -- even mechanistically -- from the bench and would
eventually have far reaching consequences for constitutional analysis.
It was not long before the common law practice in effect at the time of constitutional
ratification became totally lost in the collective judicial memory.
As a consequence of such
memory loss, judges began a lengthy and effective usurpation of the constitutional function of
the criminal jury without serious constitutional challenge. 29 In fact, it was not until the modern era
that serious constitutional challenges to the usurpation of the jury function in criminal cases were
raised, a number of which arose in death penalty cases. 30 In 1984, Spaziano v. Florida, 31 for
23

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708 (1999); Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) (citing Bvrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coooerative, Inc.. 356 US. 525,
537 (1958)); Markman v. Westview, 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996); Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412, 425-26 (1987) (quoting
CoIarove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973)); Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 153 (1973); Id. at 171 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
24 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 962.
25
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479 (quoting John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the
French Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900, pp. 36-37 (Antonio Padoa

Schioppa ed. 1987)) ("Thus, with respect to the criminal law of felonious conduct, 'the English trial judge of
the later eighteenth century had very little explicit discretion in sentencing. The substantive criminal law
tended to be sanction-specific; it prescribed a particular sentence for each offense. The judge was meant
simply to impose that sentence ..... '); Hoffman, supra note 7, at 962.
26 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 963.
27 See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 964-65; John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The
Disappearance of Criminal Jury Trial, 15 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 119-21 (1992); Chris Kemmitt, Function
over Form: Reviving the Criminal Jury's Historical Role as a Sentencing Body, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 93,95-96
(2006); Ronald Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 1355, 1374-75 (1999) ("Enthusiasm for
sentencing juries grew out of an American passion for juries as the institution that best enabled citizens to
participate in their own government. This conviction was never stronger than during the early nineteenth
century. It was early in the twentieth century when states started to limit or abandon jury sentencing and to
give judges the power to set the initial sentence in every case.').
28 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1001.
29 See sources cited supra n. 26.
30 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002);; Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990);; Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447 (1984). See also such non death penalty cases as Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
ROBERT HARDAWAY
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example, featured an accused who was sentenced to death by a judge despite a jury
recommendation of a life sentence. Although the accused appealed his sentence primarily on
Eighth Amendment grounds, the court was blindsided by a secondary claim that the judge had
violated the accused's Sixth Amendment rights by usurping the jury sentence. In addressing this
claim, an apparently non-plussed majority could not muster a single case in suppor of its dictum
that "[t]he Sixth amendment has never been thought to guarantee a right to a jury
determination of that [death penalty] issue." 32
The court's tentative dictum that the right to a jury trial in criminal sentencing has not
been "thought" to be a Sixth Amendment right appears far removed from an outright assertion,
with authority, that that there is no Sixth Amendment right to a jury in the second phase of a
criminal trial. Additionally, it should be kept in mind that Spaziano, and presumably its feeble
dictum, was undermined by a 2002 decision, Ring v. Arizona, in which the Court held that it was
a violation of the Sixth Amendment for a judge to decide whether there were aggravating
factors justifying execution. 33 In fact, the concurring opinion in Ring went even further,
concluding that the Constitution requires "jury sentencing in capital cases..."34
Judicial resistance to acknowledgment of a Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing
however still exists and is often attributed to dictum in such cases as the 1986 case, McMillan v.
Pennsylvania ("There is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing... "),35 though Ring could
muster only the later discredited Spaziano case in support of this contention.
In any case, any dictum regarding a Sixth Amendment right to sentencing which was
handed down prior to 2000 must now be reevaluated in the aftermath of Apprendi and its
progeny, initiating an evolution in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence comparable in scope to the
evolution of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence which occurred in the aftermath of Miranda v.
Arizona .36
III.

APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY

In the 2000 Supreme Court case Apprendi v. New Jersey, 37 the accused fired several
shots into the home of an African American couple and was subsequently charged with second
degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose which carried a 5-10 year term, but was
notably not charged with violation of a separate hate crime statute. After the defendant pled
guilty to the firearms charge, however, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence
that the shooting was racially motivated, a factor which if found enhanced punishment under
the statute, and sentenced the accused to a 12-year term. The accused appealed on grounds

(2004) (kidnapping); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (possession of firearm and antipersonnel
bomb); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (possession of firearm during commission of enumerated
felony).
31 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 449.
32
Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
33 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
34 Id. at 614 (Breyer, J. concurring). Interestingly, this assertion of a constitutional right to sentencing in
capital cases was based on the Eighth rather than Sixth Amendment. This is somewhat curious as the
Eighth Amendment has generally been applied in the context of the nature of the punishment itself rather
than the procedures under which the punishment was imposed. See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J.
concurring) (quoting Garder v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 371 (1977) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) "[T]he prohibition of
the Eighth Amendment relates to the character of the punishment, and not to the process by which it is
imposed').
35 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 80 (1986).
36 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also cases that came after Miranda, such as Maryland v.
Shatzer, 130 S.C. 1213 (2010); U.S. v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428 (2000);
Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
37 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000).
ROBERT HARDAWAY
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that the Due Process clause requires that any fact that increases the penalty for the crime
beyond the statutory minimum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 8
Because the trial judge had enhanced the punishment of the defendant based on his
own personal factual finding of racial motivation rather than on any jury finding of racial
motivation, the Court held that New Jersey's practice violated the accused's due process rights.
Specifically, the Court held that, except for the fact of a prior conviction: "... any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 39 The Court went on to make clear that " [i]t
is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase
the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed." 40 It cited with
approval a common law doctrine which holds that:
[w]here a statute annexes a higher degree of punishment to a common-law felony, if
committed under particular circumstances, an indictment for the offence, in order to bring
the defendant within that higher degree of punishment, must expressly charge it to have
been committed under those circumstances, and must state the circumstances with
certainty and precision. If, then, "upon an indictment under the statute, the prosecutor
prove the felony to have been committed, but fail in proving it to have been committed
under the circumstances specified in the statute, the defendant shall be convicted of the
common-law felony only.' 41

"

Thus, with one fell swoop, the Court cast away many of the fine distinctions that
theretofore had been made between the need for jury determination of facts which were
"elements" of a crime, and facts which were merely "factors" in determining mitigation of
punishment 42, holding that, regardless of classification as an element or "sentencing factor,"
[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any [emphasis added] fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury. . . ." 43The
38

/d. at 476-77(quoting U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995).
At stake in this case are constitutional protections of surpassing importance: the proscription of any
deprivation of liberty without "due process of law," and the guarantee that " [iun all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury,"
Taken together, these rights indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to "a jury determination that
[he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt
[citiatoins omitted].
39
Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
40 Id. (quoting Jones v. U.S., 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999) (Stevens, J. concurring); see also Jones, 526 U.S. at
253 (Scalia, J. concurring).
41 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 480-81 (quoting 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown, in turn cited in J. Archbold, Pleading
and Evidence in Criminal Cases, 15th ed. 44, 51 (1862)).
42 See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must
disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related
to the culpability of an accused. Traditionally, due process has required that only the most basic
procedural safeguards be observed; more subtle balancing of society's interests against those of the
accused have been left to the legislative branch. We therefore will not disturb the balance struck in
previous cases holding that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant
is charged. Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally
required; and we perceive no reason to fashion such a rule in this case and apply it to the statutory
defense at issue here. This view may seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens of proof
by labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the crimes now defined in their statutes.
But there are obviously limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard.

43 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
ROBERT HARDAWAY
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dissent in Apprendi, transparently horrified at the implications of the majority opinion, noted that
while "all facts necessary to constitute a statutory offense" 44 must be tried by a jury - the majority
opinion "casts aside our traditional cautious approach and instead embraces a universal and
seemingly bright-line rule limiting the power of congress and state legislatures to define criminal
offenses and the sentences that follow from convictions thereunder." 45 Uncontrovertibly, the
dissent recognized that the Court had set forth an "extraordinary rule." 46
But just how extraordinary?
If the only implication of the majority decision was to set forth yet another judicial
guideline for applying the legislature's federal sentencing guidelines, there would be little cause
for alarm on the part of those who fear its logical extension-namely, that the accused has a
Sixth Amendment right to a jury not just in the first phase of a criminal trial, but also in the second,
and more critical phase, of sentencing.
IV.

BREAKING THE DOCTRINAL DEADLOCK

As early as 2003, Judge Hoffman made the case that in a pair of post-Apprendi cases,
Ring v. Arizona 47 and Harris v. U.S.,48 the Court appeared to have dug itself into a doctrinal
conundrum from which the only escape was recognition of the original premise of the Sixth
Amendment: to provide to an accused the right of trial by jury in all phases of the criminal trial. 49
Hoffman's constitutional case for jury sentencing began by recalling that while Apprendi
required that "any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty for a
crime" must be tried by jury, it left open the question of whether the Sixth Amendment also
required that any fact that increased the minimum requirement also be tried by a jury.50
Hoffman noted that in the 2002 case of Ring v. Arizona, 5 1 the Court cleanly applied the
Apprendi doctrine in striking down, on Sixth Amendment grounds, an Arizona statute which
permitted a judge to determine the aggravating factors for imposition of the death penalty. In
Harris v. U.S.,52 however, decided the same day as Ring, the Court upheld a statute which
mandated a seven-year minimum sentence upon a judicial finding that the accused had
brandished a gun. This pair of cases , taken together, therefore appeared to answer the
question left open by Apprendi by holding that judicial findings of facts that might increase a
maximum sentence are necessarily to be considered as "elements" of a crime regardless of
whether they are labeled as elements or sentencing factors by a legislature, and must be
decided by a jury; but those judicial findings which required imposition of a minimum sentence,
and legislatively determined to be mere "sentencing factors," pass Sixth Amendment muster if
decided by a judge alone.
Judge Hoffman recognized the conundrum posed by these two cases, pointing out that
they have created an "impossibly difficult saddle point:"
If the Sixth Amendment means anything, it must mean that legislatures cannot deprive
criminal defendants of their right to jury trial by the simple artifice of labeling elements as
"sentencing factors'; yet there seems to be no principled basis upon which to distinguish
elements from sentencing factors. This dilemma is so sharp that the slightest change of

44/d. at 483.
45

46

47
48
49

Id. at 525.
Id.

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Harris v. U.S, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
Hoffman, supra note 7, at 982.

so id at 981.

si Hoffman, supra note 7, at 980 (describing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)).
52 Hfrris, 536 U.S. at 552.
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perspective or wording by one or two Justices seems to have a magnified effect on
outcomes in these cases. 53

Contrary to Judge Hoffman's observation, however, the Ring-HarriS 54 pair did provide a
basis for distinguishing between "elements" which must be decided by a jury, and "sentencing
factors" which may be tried by a judge-namely, that factors which increase the maximum
must be treated as "elements" regardless of legislative labeling, while factors which increase the
minimum may be treated as sentencing factors if labeled as such legislatively.
The conundrum, therefore, is not to be found in any ambiguity in the setting forth of the
principle, but rather in the doctrinal soundness of the principle itself, and perhaps this is what
Judge Hoffman meant in his assertion that Ring-Harris set forth no "principled" basis for
distinguishing between elements and sentencing factors. It should also be noted, however, that
Hoffman's claim that legislatures now have a free path to bypass Apprendi by the simple
expedient of "increasing maximum sentences to accommodate what would otherwise have
been an enhanced sentence and then imposing higher and/or mandatory minimum sentences
to reflect the enhancement" was thoroughly addressed in Apprendi by Justice Stevens who
opined that if legislatures attempted any such course, the Court would consider whether it was
56
constitutional by falling back on such pre-Apprendi decisions as Patterson 55 and Mullaney. 57
Nevertheless, the post-Apprendi cases decided up to and including those decided
through 2010 which have attempted to tread the ultimately hapless doctrinal path through the
Ring-Harris thicket5 8 do support Judge Hoffman's conclusion, first articulated in 2003 in the
aftermath of that pair of cases, that the only principled way for the court to escape the current
doctrinal morass is to hold that under the Sixth Amendment "judges will not ... be able to impose
any sentences."5 9

53 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 982.
54 See 536 U.S. 584, 604-06 n.5, 609(2002); 536 U.S. 545, 557-561 (2002).

Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
57 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 n. 16 (2000) ('The principal dissent would reject the Court's rule
as a "meaningless formalism,' because it can conceive of hypothetical statutes that would comply with
the rule and achieve the same result as the New Jersey statute. Post, at 2388-2390. While a State could,
hypothetically, undertake to revise its entire criminal code in the manner the dissent suggests, post, at 2389extending all statutory maximum sentences to, for example, 50 years and giving judges guided discretion
as to a few specially selected factors within that range-this possibility seems remote. Among other reasons,
structural democratic constraints exist to discourage legislatures from enacting penal statutes that expose
every defendant convicted of, for example, weapons possession, to a maximum sentence exceeding that
which is, in the legislature's judgment, generally proportional to the crime. This is as it should be. Our rule
ensures that a State is obliged 'to make its choices concerning the substantive content of its criminal laws
with full awareness of the consequences, unable to mask substantive policy choices" of exposing all who
are convicted to the maximum sentence it provides. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S., at 228-229, n. 13,
(Powell, J., dissenting). So exposed, " [t]he political check on potentially harsh legislative action is then more
likely to operate." Ibid. In all events, if such an extensive revision of the State's entire criminal code were
enacted for the purpose the dissent suggests, or if New Jersey simply reversed the burden of the hate crime
finding (effectively assuming a crime was performed with a purpose to intimidate and then requiring a
defendant to prove that it was not, post, at 2390), we would be required to question whether the revision
was constitutional under this Court's prior decisions. See Patterson, 432 U.S., at 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319; Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698-702, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) ").
58
See, e.g., Dillion v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2692 (2010); United States v. O'Brien, 130 S.Ct. 2169, 21732175 (2010); Oregon v. Ice, 129 S.Ct. 711, 716-18 (2009); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 352-55 (2007);
Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 282-89 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230-38 (2005);
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24-27 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301-06 (2004); Schriro
v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353-56 (2004).
s9 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 985.
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CONCLUSION

The central holding of Apprendi that the Sixth Amendment requires that "all facts
necessary to constitute a statutory offense" must be "tr(ied) to a jury" 60 has laid the foundation
for establishing the principle originally envisioned by the framers of establishing a wide barrier
between an accused and the vast power of the state. 61 The gradual judicial usurpation of the
accused's right to a jury during the second critical phase of the criminal trial confirms the Sixth
Amendment framers' fear "that the jury right could be lost not only by gross denial, but by
erosion." 62 Such judicial usurpation also stands in dire contrast to the continued and meticulous
judicial recognition of the right to a jury in all phases of the civil trial under the Seventh
Amendment. 63
There exists no precedential or stare decisis barriers to recognition of a Sixth Amendment
guarantee to an accused's right of trial by jury in the most critical sentencing phase of his trial,
either in the unsupported dictum of the pre-Apprendi caseS 64 or in dictum in post-Apprendi
cases referring to pre-Apprendi cases.
Only a full recognition of the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment can resolve the
current doctrinal mass of cases, particularly those cases that have become entangled in
attempting to reconcile both state and federal cases applying sentencing guidelines. 65
Although the doctrinal leap from the Apprendi holding to one recognizing a Sixth
Amendment right to jury sentencing would be a relatively small one, the practical implications
would be significant for the criminal justice system. Notably though, the court in recent years
has not hesitated to make similar dramatic doctrinal expansions in the criminal justice field. For
example, in the 2004 case of Crawford v. Washington, 66 the Supreme Court did not hesitate to
abandon the holding of Roberts v. Ohio, which had held that the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation clause could be satisfied without physical confrontation of a witness in court by a
showing that a witness was unavailable and that his out of court statement satisfied a "firmly
rooted" hearsay exception. 67 In that case, the court discarded many decades of judicial
precedent, and instead relied upon common law practice as it existed in 1791.68
Additionally, and as recently as June of 2010, the Supreme Court, examining practice
and legislative history from 1791, overturned 70 years of precedent and a consensus of circuit
cases 69 to hold that the Second Amendment was an individual rather than collective right. 70
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483.
Id. at 477 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (4th ed. 1873)).
62 Id. at 483 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999)).
63
See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376-83 (1996); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and
Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564-67 (1990); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152-64 (1973);
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336-40 (1966); Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 471-79 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); ILC Peripherals
Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 444-49 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
64 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984). Discussed
supra p. 6.
65
See, e.g., Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010); United States v. O'Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169 (2010);
Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007); Cunningham v. California, 549
U.S. 270 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
66 Crawford v. Washington, 541. U.S. 36 (2004).
67 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
68 541 U.S. at 54-59.
69 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) ("The second amendment guarantees no right
to keep and bear a firearm that does not have 'some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia.'") (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)); United
States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1313 n.5 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 216 (6th Cir.
1999); San Diego Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 1996); Hickman v. Block,
81 F.3d 98, 100-01 (9th Cir. 1996); Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270-71 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v.
60
61
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Nevertheless, any future judicial attempts to make such a doctrinal leap will doubtless
become mired in the conceptual sinkholes opened up by such post-Apprendi cases as U.S. v.
Booker (which can be read as requiring application of Apprendi only in the context of
mandatory sentencing guidelines, and leaves open the possibility of judge sentencing in a nonmandatory sentencing regime)71 , and Oregon v. Ice 72 (which held that the Sixth Amendment
does not inhibit a judge from finding facts relevant to whether consecutive rather than
concurrent sentences should be imposed.)
It is therefore submitted that only a clean doctrinal leap in the form of a clear cut holding
that a defendant in a criminal case has a Sixth Amendment right to have his sentence
determined by a jury can extricate the courts from the current doctrinal morass while at the
same time serving both the spirit and letter of the constitutional right to jury in both phases of the
criminal trial.
As has already occurred in Fifth Amendment 73 and Confrontation 74 jurisprudence, half a
loaf, and even three quarters of a loaf, must inevitably give way to a full one.

Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Wilbur, 545 F.2d 764, 767 (1st Cir. 1976); Cases v.
United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921-23 (1st Cir. 1942); see also Robert Hardaway, The inconvenient Militia Clause
of the Second Amendment: Why the Supreme Court Declines to Resolve the Debate over the Right to Bear
Arms, 16 ST. JoHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 41, 43 n.12 (2002) (providing a more extensive list of supporting cases).

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2010).
Booker, 543 U.S.at 334 ( Breyer, J. dissenting)
Thus, as far as the federal statutes are concerned, the federal system, unlike the state system at
issue in Blakely, provides a defendant with no guarantee that the jury's finding of factual elements
will result in a sentence lower than the statutory maximum. Rather, the statutes put a potential
federal defendant on notice that a judge conceivably might sentence him anywhere within the
range provided by statute-regardless of the applicable Guidelines range. Hence as a practical
matter, they grant a potential federal defendant less assurance of a lower Guidelines sentence
than did the state statutes at issue in Blakely.
72 ICE, 129 S.Ct. at 718
In light of this history, legislative reforms regarding the imposition of multiple sentences do not implicate
the core concerns that prompted our decision in Apprendi. There is no encroachment here by the
judge upon facts historically found by the jury, nor any threat to the jury's domain as a bulwark at trial
between the State and the accused. Instead, the defendant-who historically may have faced
consecutive sentences by default-has been granted by some modern legislatures statutory protections
meant to temper the harshness of the historical practice.
73 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
74 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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